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Abstract— This paper proposes to integrate biometric-based key 
generation into an obfuscated interpretation algorithm to protect 
authentication application software from illegitimate use or 
reverse-engineering. This is especially necessary for mCommerce 
because application programmes on mobile devices, such as 
Smartphones and Tablet-PCs are typically open for misuse by 
hackers. Therefore, the scheme proposed in this paper ensures 
that a correct interpretation / execution of the obfuscated 
program code of the authentication application requires a valid 
biometric generated key of the actual person to be authenticated, 
in real-time. Without this key, the real semantics of the program 
can not be understood by an attacker even if he/she gains access 
to this application code. Furthermore, the security provided by 
this scheme can be a vital aspect in protecting any application 
running on mobile devices that are increasingly used to perform 
business/financial or other security related applications, but are 
easily lost or stolen. The scheme starts by creating a personalised 
copy of any application based on the biometric key generated 
during an enrolment process with the authenticator as well as a 
nuance created at the time of communication between the client 
and the authenticator. The obfuscated code is then shipped to the 
client’s mobile devise and integrated with real-time biometric 
extracted data of the client to form the unlocking key during 
execution. The novelty of this scheme is achieved by the close 
binding of this application program to the biometric key of the 
client, thus making this application unusable for others. Trials 
and experimental results on biometric key generation, based on 
client's faces, and an implemented scheme prototype, based on 
the Android emulator, prove the concept and novelty of this 
proposed scheme. 
Keywords-biometrics; mobile applications, obfuscated 
interpretation; software protection 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Software anti-piracy protection techniques attempt to 
contain/limit the financial damage of software piracy or misuse 
of any kind. Software misuse is rapidly increasing every year 
and it was quoted to cost the industry some $51.4 billion in 
2009 [1]. One of the major concerns to software developing 
companies and software users in today’s highly mobile and 
connected world is the distribution of “cracked”, and the use of 
unlicensed software. On the other hand, mobile applications on 
Smartphones or Tablet-PCs, e.g. iPhone/Android based 
devices, are increasingly used to perform financial/business or 
security related transactions everywhere anytime. As these 
mobile devices are easily lost or stolen, the protection of data 
and applications on such devices against unauthorised 
access/use becomes even more important. 
Biometric-based (or data regarding one's identity, or 
something you are) authentication, knowledge-based (or data 
of something you know, e.g. a password) authentication and 
object-based (or data about something you have, e.g. a token) 
authentication have been used extensively in various remote 
communication to validate a client to an authenticator [2]. In 
contrast to object-based or knowledge-based authentication 
factors, in biometric-based authentication a legitimate client 
does not have to carry or remember anything to perform the 
authentication. However, biometric authentication, which is 
known to be more reliable than the other traditional 
authentication methods, requires only the physical presence of 
the client, which makes it a very convenient and simple to use 
for authentication. 
Current generations of personal computers, notebooks, 
Smartphones or Tablet-PCs feature a wide variety of sensors 
(e.g. camera, microphone or multi-touch displays) that can be 
easily employed to capture a client's biometrics. 
This paper proposes to use a biometric key, generated from 
fresh and real-time captured client biometric data, in 
conjunction with obfuscated interpretation to protect the 
"execution of a software application" on the client’s device. 
Without presenting the correct biometric key to the system, the 
obfuscated program will not run at all or will produce an 
incorrect authentication for any illegitimate client. 
A prototype of oBiometrics is implemented on an Android 
platform emulator. It is designed in such a way that it can 
handle both normal (unprotected) applications as well as 
obfuscated (protected) applications at the same time. Also, the 
proposed methods can be combined seamlessly and trouble-
free with other software protection techniques, e.g. opaque 
predicates or lexical/control flow transformations as the 
instruction obfuscation is employed on the result of previous 
transformation steps. Additional software protection methods 
that increase the number of instructions can further enhance the 
security of the obfuscated interpretation. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II 
describes the background and outlines related work of software 
protection techniques and biometric-based key generation. 
Section III introduces the general concept of the proposed 
biometric-secured obfuscated interpretation scheme. Section IV 
describes the implementation of the prototype application 
based on the Android emulator and discusses the trial and 
experimental results. Finally, we conclude the paper and 
outline future work in Section V. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. Software protection techniques 
Software protection can be broadly categorised into three 
main groups [3]: 1) Software watermarking, 2) Software 
tamper proofing or tamper resistance, and 3) Software 
obfuscation. Software watermarking adds visible or hidden 
information to source code to prevent software theft or to proof 
the original ownership, if a misuse of a piece of software has 
been discovered. To generate resilient, cheap and stealthy 
software watermarks various methods based on, for example, 
opaque predicates [4], register allocation [5] or self-validating 
branches [6] were proposed. Software tamper proofing or more 
precisely tamper resistance (as every protection mechanism can 
be bypassed with sufficient knowledge, time or resources) tries 
to prevent illegal modification or distribution of software. 
Examples of proposed tamper resistance techniques include 
self-modifying and self-decrypting Integrity Verification 
kernels (IVK) [7] or dynamic integrity checking [8]. Software 
obfuscation is similar to tamper resistance in that it also aims to 
protect the code against malicious modifications. However, in 
contrast to tamper resistance, software obfuscation [9] attempts 
to transform a piece of software into an equivalent program 
that has the same behaviour but is more difficult to reverse-
engineer and therefore harder to manipulate by an attacker. 
Neither watermarking nor tamper resistance or obfuscation 
techniques alone can guarantee a fully protected software [10]. 
But even though one technique on its own can be easily broken 
[11], a combination of several methods can “raise the bar” 
substantially. This makes any attempt to fool such protection 
system uneconomical for the attacker. 
Monden has introduced a framework for obfuscated 
interpretation [12] where a hardware implemented finite state 
machine (FSM) was proposed. This ASM “retranslates” the 
instructions of an obfuscated program into the original ones 
during program execution/interpretation (Fig. 1). The main 
security concept of obfuscation interpretation is that a program 
can be considered "secure" (in terms of reverse-engineering) if 
an attacker can not understand the real semantics of the 
program from the available code instructions, without having 
the state transition rules for the retranslation (reverse 
obfuscation). A major drawback of the framework proposed by 
Monden is that the change of the transition rules is very 
difficult in the hardware based implementation of the FSM 
during development and nearly impossible once the hardware 
unit is integrated into the end-user device. In addition, dummy 
instructions must be injected into the code to guarantee the 
correct interpretation by the FSM. However, dummy 
instructions could leak information about the real semantics of 
the program code and so make attacks possible. To overcome 
these problems, Zhang [13] proposed an obfuscated 
interpretation framework that uses a permutation-based 
interpreter (PMI) implemented in software. The PMI allows in 
their proposed framework an easy change of the transition rules 
and does not require any additional dummy instructions. 
Recently, Zeng [14] has developed a software watermarking 
scheme based on obfuscated interpretation.  
oBiometrics uses a protection scheme similar to [13], but 
uses biometric generated keys to (de-)obfuscate instructions 
during program development and execution/interpretation. This 
will tightly bind the obfuscated software to the legitimate client 
and shall remove the requirement to hide the interpreter from 
the program user (or a possible attacker) as well as the 
necessary encryption of the permutation rules described by 
Zhang. 
 
Figure 1.  Concept of obfuscated interpretation as originally proposed in [12] 
B. Biometric key generation methods 
Biometric cryptosystems have been proposed to provide 
stronger security mechanisms by combining biometrics with 
cryptography. Biometric cryptosystems can be broadly 
categorised into three main approaches: (i) key release, (ii) key 
generation, and (iii) key binding. 
In the key release approach, the cryptographic key and the 
biometric data of a client are stored as two separate identities at 
different hosts where the key is released only when an 
authentication attempt of the client is successful. This method 
is straightforward and easy to implement but it has two major 
drawbacks [15]. The first drawback is due to the fact that 
biometric templates are not secure and that the "biometric 
matcher" can be overridden. The second drawback is due to the 
fact that cryptographic keys are not secure because they are not 
combined with biometric data when compared to the other two 
approaches. 
In the key generation approach, a cryptographic key is 
directly derived from the biometric data without storing it 
anywhere. Typically, biometric features in this approach are 
represented as a binary string and the robust bits are selected as 
a cryptographic key. It has been shown that such methods have 
high False Rejection Rates (FRRs) which them an impractical 
method [16]. 
Finally, in key binding approaches, the biometric template 
and the key are combined in a way that makes it 
computationally infeasible to retrieve the key without previous 
knowledge of client’s biometric data. The cryptographic key is 
randomly generated during the enrolment stage. Then it is 
discarded after combining it with the biometric data. At the 
authentication stage, the cryptographic key is released only if 
the query biometric sample is matched. It is known that 
biometric data are fuzzy due to intra-class variations resulting 
from the differences between the freshly captured biometric 
sample and the enrolled templates. On the other hand, 
cryptographic keys have to be precise and repeatable every 
time. Therefore, there is a need to employ error correction 
techniques such as Error Correcting Codes (ECC) to bridge the 
gap between the fuzziness of biometric and the preciseness of 
cryptographic keys. 
oBiometrics adopts the key binding approach for our 
implementation based on face biometric. Note that, throughout 
this paper "key binding" and "key generation" are used 
similarly. Fig. 2 illustrates the process of biometric key 
binding. The cryptographic key is fed into an ECC encoder and 
then XORed with the binary representation of biometric data to 
produce a biometric lock or helper data. After that, the key is 
discarded and the biometric lock and the hash of the key are 
saved. The binary representation of the biometric data is 
calculated from extracted biometric features where a client-
based transformation such as random projection [17] can be 
employed to produce cancellable biometric followed by a 
biometric binarisation. At the authentication stage (key 
retrieval stage), the binary representation is calculated using a 
fresh biometric sample in the same way as described above and 
then XORed with the biometric lock. Then, an error correcting 
technique is used in the decoding mode to tolerate intra-class 
variation. The decoding is successful and the key released if the 
difference between the reference biometric sample(s) and the 
fresh biometric sample is within a certain predefined threshold. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Biometric key binding process 
III. BIOMETRIC-SECURED OBFUSCATED INTERPRETATION 
The two base elements of the oBiometrics scheme are (1) 
the biometric key generation and (2) a standard software 
development cycle supplemented by an optional specification 
step that defines the application elements to be obfuscated (Fig. 
3). 
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Figure 3.  Application development and client enrolment 
During an enrolment process, biometric keys are generated 
from the freshly taken client biometrics (e.g. face) and stored 
for later use (application obfuscation) in a database together 
with additional client information (e.g. unique client identifier). 
To protect the sensitive client-specific biometric data, only 
cancellable / revocable biometric keys [18] are used and stored 
in the database. 
A possible usage scenario for oBiometrics is a remote 
authentication process between a client and a bank in a 
mCommerce transaction. For example, the bank wants to offer 
their services only to enrolled clients, who have been 
successfully verified to the bank at the moment of system use. 
Another application example is when any software developer 
or business company (e.g. bank) wants to distribute a new (or 
an updated version of) their biometric-secured software 
application to their enrolled clients. Then, a standard software 
development cycle (e.g. Java development for Android based 
mobile devices) is executed. If it is not possible or desired that 
the complete application is protected by obfuscated 
interpretation (e.g. when some parts may be used as libraries by 
other (not protected) applications), then an optional 
development step can specify the elements to be obfuscated. 
Otherwise the complete application code is obfuscated. If the 
software works as expected, the new (or updated) application is 
obfuscated using the biometric key. In this process, the original 
program instructions are substituted (obfuscated) with 
instructions selected on the basis of each client's stored 
biometric key making the resultant application program code 
uniquely tailored/dependent on each client. This individual 
biometrically-secured obfuscated application "code" is then 
distributed to its associated and enrolled client for installation 
on the client’s device, e.g. Smartphone. To enhance the 
authentication process, some transactions may encode a 
"nuance" generated at the communication/transaction time to 
secure the transmitted program code and so eliminate the 
replay attacks. 
Secure storage of the client’s cancellable biometric keys in 
the proposed scheme removes the necessity of re-enrolment of 
the client for each new (or updated) version of the application, 
which would be expensive, time-consuming and inefficient in 
scenarios with many applications and enrolled clients. 
Once a client wants to execute a possible protected 
application on the mobile device, for example for 
authentication purpose for a financial transaction, the proposed 
scheme shall start the application and check if this application 
is protected and so needs an obfuscation interpretation (Fig. 4). 
As the general layout and the instructions of an obfuscated 
program are not distinguishable from an unprotected program 
during interpretation/execution, an additional label is inserted 
during the obfuscation process. If this label is present in the 
application, or in some parts of the application, then the 
scheme invokes a process, which generates a new biometric 
key from a freshly taken client biometrics (e.g. face), and 
passes this key to the application interpreter to perform the 
obfuscated interpretation. Otherwise, the application is 
executed normally by the interpreter. 
 
Figure 4.  Application execution on client’s mobile device 
IV. OBIOMETRICS IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
A. Prototype implementation 
To test this proposed biometric-secured obfuscated 
interpretation scheme, and to verify the practicality of this 
authentication, a prototype implementation, based on Android 
version 2.2 (Froyo), was developed. 
Android is a software stack initially invented by Android 
Inc. and since 2005 developed by Google Inc and the Open 
Handset Alliance [19]. The fact that the complete software 
stack, including the operating system, middleware and 
important applications are available to the development 
community as Open Source makes Android a perfect candidate 
for this prototype development. Furthermore, Android is the 
fastest growing operating system used in mobile devices with 
enhanced sensors and capabilities. Note that this 
implementation does require the use of Smartphones so to 
capture and process the biometric data. It is expected that 
Android will surplus all other mobile operating systems by 
2014 [20]. 
The Android operating system is based on a modified 
Linux kernel. System and client applications are 
executed/interpreted by the Dalvik virtual machine (DVM) 
which is part of the Android runtime and located in the 
Android system architecture above the Linux kernel. The DVM 
is a register-based virtual machine which interprets Dalvik byte 
code instructions generated by the “dx” tool from compiled 
Java language sources, i.e. each application, when started on an 
Android device, is first loaded from an .apk-file which contains 
the generated Dalvik byte code instructions. This is then 
verified and optimised before being interpreted by the DVM 
(Fig. 5). 
For our testing, to execute the biometric-secured obfuscated 
interpretation inside the DVM, the source code of the DVM 
was adapted; a new operating system image was compiled; and 
used with the Android emulator for testing this prototype 
implementation. 
 
Figure 5.  DVM steps during application execution 
B. Byte code instructions for obfuscation 
In order for an application to pass the compilation, loading, 
verification and optimisation steps of the Android DVM, not 
all byte code instructions can be substituted during the 
obfuscation process. For example, it is not possible to replace 
the “return-void” instruction because this is the only DVM 
instruction without parameters. Similarly, “iget*”, “iput*”, 
“invoke-*” or “invoke-*/range” instructions (Table I) can not 
be obfuscated because these instructions are automatically 
replaced by the DVM optimiser with other instructions, and 
thus are not available to the interpreter for de-obfuscation. 
Finally, instructions can be only replaced with other 
instructions, if and only if they have the same general return 
type as well as the same number and type of parameters. All 
other substitutions would not pass the verification stage of the 
DVM. For example the “add-int” instruction can only be 
substituted with 16 byte code instructions, the “if-eqz” with 6 
instructions (Table II). 
Obviously, the security of obfuscated interpretation 
increases by increasing number of instructions that can be used 
for substitution of byte code instructions. Table III shows the 
total number of instructions for six Android applications. The 
first four applications (Browser, Contacts, E-Mail and Phone) 
are standard system applications available on all Android 
mobile devices, while the remaining two applications (PayPal 
and FXCM Mobile TSII (MarketSimplified Inc)) are “top-free 
in Finance” applications from the Android market. The total 
number of byte code instructions in the .apk-file of the 
application varies between 23.000 (Browser) and 100.000 (E-
Mail) with around 60% of instructions that can be theoretically 
obfuscated. 
TABLE I.  INSTRUCTIONS REPLACED BY DVM OPTIMISER 
Instruction 
group Instruction Mnemonic 
iget* iget, iget-wide, iget-object, iget-boolean, iget-short, iget-byte, iget-char, iget-short 
iput* iput, iput-wide, iput-object, iput-boolean, iput-short, iput-byte, iput-char, iput-short 
invoke-* invoke-virtual, invoke-super,  invoke-direct, invoke-static 
invoke-*/range invoke-virtual/range, invoke-super/range,  invoke-direct/range, invoke-static/range 
TABLE II.  POSSIBLE INSTRUCTION SUBSTITUTIONS 
Instruction Possible substitutions 
add-int 
add-int, sub-int, mul-int, div-int, rem-int, 
and-int, or-int, xor-int, shl-int, shr-int, 
ushr-int, add-float, sub-float, mul-float, 
div-float, rem-float 
if-eqz if-eqz, if-nez, if-ltz, if-gez, if-gtz, if-lez 
TABLE III.  INSTRUCTIONS AVAILABLE FOR OBFUSCATION 
Application 
name 
Total # 
instructions 
# instructions 
to obfuscate 
% instructions 
to obfuscate 
Browser 23000 14400 63% 
Contacts 33800 22100 65% 
E-Mail 99600 67700 68% 
Phone 42200 25100 59% 
Paypal 60000 38600 64% 
FXCM Mobile 34300 20900 61% 
 
C. Biometric generated keys 
The oBiometrics prototype implementation of biometric 
key binding (generation) is based on face biometric as 
illustrated in Fig. 2. The Extended Yale B database [21], which 
has 38 subjects and each one in frontal pose has 64 images 
captured under different illumination conditions, is used for the 
experiments. The images in the database are divided into five 
subsets according to the direction of the light-source from the 
camera axis. Fig. 6 illustrates this variation for images of the 
same person in the database. 
 
Figure 6.  Images for the same person in different illumination subsets 
In the experiments, the first three images per client from 
subset 1 (the Yale-B database) were selected as the gallery set 
and all the remaining images were used for matching. Discrete 
Wavelet Transforms (DWTs) are selected as a facial feature 
extraction technique to be used efficiently on Smartphones. By 
selecting wavelet feature at the third level of decomposition, 
each face is represented by 504 value feature vector X, which 
is then converted to a binary string as described in [22]. By 
analysing the error patterns of inter- and intra-class variation of 
face images, it was concluded that 38% of the binary face 
feature vectors need to be corrected, i.e. 191 bits out of 504 
bits. In other words, if the hamming distance between two 
binary feature vectors is less than 191, then the two feature 
vectors belong to the same individual. Otherwise, the two 
feature vectors are considered to be from two different 
individuals. To cope with intra-class variations of face samples, 
Reed-Solomon (RS) error correcting code algorithm is selected 
(version RS(511,129,191)), which takes a cryptographic key of 
size 129 bits as an input to produce a biometric lock of size 511 
bits, and corrects up to 191 errors. 
The experiments showed that the Equal Error Rates (EERs 
%) of biometric key binding is 0%, 0.9%, 1.33%, 15.48%, 
17.15% for subset1, subset2, subset3, subset4, and subset5 of 
the extended Yale face dataset respectively based on Reed-
Solomon ECC to retrieve a key of size 129 bits. It is worth 
mentioning that the 129 bit biometric key can be used as a seed 
to generate longer keys of any length based on techniques such 
as Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR). 
D. oBiometrics application development and byte code 
obfuscation 
Android applications are written in Java, compiled with 
Java language compilers and then converted to Dalvik byte 
code by the Android “dx” tool. In oBiometrics prototype, the 
concept of Java Annotations is used to define which methods 
and/or complete classes should be obfuscated. Introducing the 
concept of “partial obfuscation” in the oBiometrics allows 
protection of nothing but the important parts and algorithms of 
an application. This will speed-up the DVM interpretation in 
applications which do not require complete code protection as 
the number of necessary de-obfuscation steps decreases. To 
obfuscate the byte code instructions, the Dalvik source code is 
de-compiled in the prototype by a disassembler. Fig. 7 shows 
an example of a short java method with an “Obfuscate” 
annotation, two integer parameters and the resultant de-
compiled Dalvik byte code. 
As the number of instructions available for obfuscation 
varies from application to application, an instruction 
substitution key with a fixed length, as produced by a standard 
biometric key generator, is not applicable. A pseudorandom 
number generator (PRNG) with the biometric generated key as 
seed is used to produce a pseudorandom bit stream of the 
required length. 
 
Figure 7.  Java source code and Dalvik byte code instructions 
Depending on the byte code instruction and the next random 
bits from the PRNG output, an instruction from the same 
instruction group is selected. Fig. 8 shows the obfuscation 
process for the two instructions “add-int” and “if-gez” (see Fig 
7 and Table II). First, the biometric key of the enrolled client is 
then extracted from the biometric key database and used as a 
seed to the PRNG. “add-int” is in step 2 the first instruction 
which needs to be obfuscated. The group size of possible 
substitutions for this instruction is 16 elements, i.e. requires 4 
bits from the key stream. The first 4 bits from the stream are 
“0110” (or position 6 in the group, starting with 0). These bits 
are then used to index the substitution instruction “or-int”. The 
group of the second instruction “if-gez” contains 6 elements 
and therefore requires only the next 3 bits (“010”) from the key 
stream; resulting in the substitution instruction “if-ltz”. After 
all instructions are successfully obfuscated, the byte code is 
assembled again. This "obfuscation and protected Android 
application file" can be then distributed to the client. 
 
Figure 8.  Instruction obfuscation process 
E. Application execution and de-obfuscation process on the 
mobile device 
Upon receiving the obfuscated application from the 
authenticator, the client installs it on his mobile device. Once 
the client starts this protected application, the DVM on the 
mobile device triggers a process to capture fresh biometric 
information of the client. A biometric key and its 
pseudorandom bit stream are then calculated/generated in 
similar steps to the key generation process at the authenticator 
side (cp. section IV.D). The resultant PRNG output is then 
used to de-obfuscate the application code during interpretation. 
Based on the next PRNG input value and the following 
obfuscated instruction read from the protected byte code, the 
original instruction is determined/obtained by reversing the 
used obfuscation rule (Table II). The resultant de-obfuscated 
code is then ready to be executed by the DVM. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper proposes to combine biometric-
based key generation with obfuscated interpretation to prevent 
the illegitimate execution of applications as well as to protect 
the software against reverse-engineering. This is particularly 
aimed at, but not limited to, application software installed on 
mobile devices with enhanced capabilities and sensors such as 
Smartphones or Tablet-PCs. oBiometrics can be utilised in a 
similar way to all kinds of software programs running on 
standard PCs. Obfuscating the program instructions with a 
client's specific biometric key shall tightly binds the genuine 
client to the application and hence eliminates the possibility 
that an attacker is able to use this protected application. This 
becomes more and more important as the use of mobile devices 
to perform financial/business or other security related 
transactions grows. 
The implemented prototype of oBiometrics based on 
Android Froyo shows clearly the practicality of this proposed 
scheme. That is the advantages and benefits of this tight 
combination of biometric authentication and software 
protection through obfuscated interpretation. The Dalvik virtual 
machine (which runs all system and client applications on 
Android based mobile devices) was modified to test the 
obfuscated interpretation in a real operating system 
environment. An Android system image with the adapted 
DVM was generated and used in the emulator based trials and 
experiments. Analyses of many Android build-in and market-
place applications as well as the Dalvik byte code structure 
shows that around 60% of all byte code instructions can be 
statistically obfuscated. Also note that instructions can be 
replaced only with similar ones from the same instruction 
group. Otherwise the byte code verifier or optimiser would 
recognise the incorrect program and an application installation 
on the mobile device would not be possible. Also, the group 
size of similar instructions varies for the Android Dalvik byte 
code between two and sixteen elements. This results in an 
immense number of possible substitution combinations. For 
example, a simple method with only 20 instructions (10 
instructions from the “add-int” and 10 from the “if-eq” group) 
would already result in 6.6*1019 possible combinations. The 
fact that a standard Android application has several thousand 
byte code instructions makes it very difficult to understand the 
real semantics of a program without having the correct de-
obfuscation key. Although it would be possible for an attacker 
to start a program protected by oBiometrics, as the obfuscated 
program is still a valid application, the attacker can not be sure 
about the program behaviour or results, or if the program 
terminates correctly. However, it is more likely that the 
program will crash and produce no meaningful output at all. 
Since oBiometrics adds with the required byte code 
deobfuscation process an additional step to the application 
interpretation and therefore increases the application execution 
time. As the methods and classes and consequently the 
resultant number of byte code instructions to be deobfuscated 
can be precisely specified during the application development 
process, the run-time overhead can be adjusted to the desired 
security level of the application. Trails on the emulator showed 
that the introduced overhead by oBiometrics is not noticeable 
for any client in an authentication application scenario. 
However, full time and CPU overhead measurements are 
planed when the full actual implementation has been completed 
and tested on Android mobile devices. 
B. Future work 
Work on the biometric-secured obfuscation interpretation is 
ongoing to further analyse and enhance the security of 
oBiometrics. As a first step, the authors will extent the 
prototype and implement all possible instruction substitutions 
in the obfuscation process as well as inside the Dalvik virtual 
machine. Furthermore, real-world experiments and trials on 
Android mobile devices will be carried out, which requires 
installation of the adapted Android operating system on real 
hardware. 
The authors will also investigate, how the integration of 
present location and real-time into the key generation and 
obfuscation process can further eliminate various possibilities 
of application misuse, i.e. by employing the current location of 
the mobile device determined by the GPS receiver into the 
obfuscation algorithms. This shall eliminate various types of 
"distance attacks" which are a main threat to mobile devices 
and mobile based applications. 
To further verify and increase the security of oBiometrics, 
the results of various de-compilation and reverse-engineering 
tools for Java and Dalvik byte code, e.g. “undx” or “Dex2Jar” 
on the biometric-secured obfuscation applications will be 
analysed. However, first reverse-engineering experiments 
clearly showed that these programs are not able to restore the 
original semantics of the obfuscated applications. 
Finally, the combination of biometric-secured obfuscated 
interpretation with other software protection techniques, e.g. 
control flow obfuscation [23] or opaque constructs [24], will be 
investigated. It is expected, that these techniques can be easily 
used together and that a combination will not negatively effect 
the obfuscated interpretation. In contrast, they should further 
enhance the security of oBiometrics as they build a first line of 
defence against attacks and even increase in some cases the 
number of instructions which then can be obfuscated. 
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